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Abstract 
The article examines the question of whether the current account deficits seen in selected transition economies 
in recent years mainly as a symptom of the dynamic economic activity of the catching-up process are a source of 
potential macroeconomic destabilisation. Given the possible significant reduction of capital flows, as well as 
restrictions and lessons from recent financial crises, current account deficits must be closely monitored in the 
region. In this respect, the issue of ‘current account sustainability’ in seventeen transition economies is 
investigated. For this purpose, two accounting frameworks (Milesi-Ferreti and Razin, 1996; Reisen, 1998) 
based on certain strict assumptions are employed. The results show that if the observed level of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows is kept in the medium run almost all countries could optimally have a higher level of 
external deficit, with the exception of countries such as Baltic States, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova and 
Romania. Accordingly, the maintenance of relatively large FDI inflows (especially greenfield investments) to 
national economies is a key priority in securing future external sustainability. In the end, the results indicate 
that current account deficits of transition economies that exceed 5 percent of GDP generally involve problems 
of their external sustainability. 
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
 
This article has examined the dynamics and related sustainability of current account positions 
of several transition countries. By using different accounting framework approaches the 
empirical results show that on the strict (and quite unrealistic) assumption of a sudden halt in 
foreign direct investment (FDI) most of the selected countries would not have a sustainable 
current account deficit level. When we take into consideration the arbitrary threshold of 4 
percent of GDP for future FDI flows, the observed current account deficits in the CEE and 
SEE regions generally reflect sustainable positions. However, Latvia (-8.4 percent of GDP) 
and Macedonia (-4.9) in fact have deficits that are well above the estimated sustainable 
levels. A similar conclusion holds for Moldova within the CIS region, which exceeds its 
estimated sustainable level by more than ten percentage points. This huge difference between 
actual and estimated sustainable current account positions in Moldova emerges in spite of it 
having one of the highest levels of sustainable current account deficits (-6.0 percent of GDP), 
induced by its relatively high ratio of external debt. Further, if we assume that the observed 
average level of FDI will be kept in the medium term in the transition regions similar results 
to the preceding scenario are found. As far as the CEE region is concerned, the actual average 
non-interest current account deficits lie well below the estimated sustainable levels for the 
great majority of countries. Surprisingly, high levels of sustainable current account deficits 
are held by Slovakia and the Czech Republic (in the CEE region) with around 10 and 9 
percent of GDP, respectively, and Bulgaria and Croatia (in the SEE region) in the range of 7-
8 percent of GDP. These high levels do not derive from a very high average growth 
prospective but from the relatively low real effective interest and significant net FDI flows 
seen in recent years. On the contrary, due to the relatively low net FDI inflows Romania has 
moved beyond the sustainable level of -3.2 percent of GDP and joins Latvia, Macedonia and 
Moldova with their unsustainable current account positions. However, not far away and lying 
around half a percentage point from the unsustainable current account balance threshold are 
Lithuania and, not surprisingly, Hungary, with the lowest net FDI flows (averaging at 1.4 
percent of GDP) in the CEE region recently. Thus, the analysis also reveals that the current 
account deficits of transition economies in excess of 5 percent of GDP generally pose 
external sustainability problems. Therefore, as part of strengthening the external position the 
further promotion of FDI (especially greenfield investments)  and a prudent fiscal policy 
should become necessary elements of economic policy created in the region.  However, the 
simplicity and restrictiveness of the applied accounting frameworks and data limitations call 
for some additional approaches to measure the transition economies’ external sustainability. 
Therefore, certain other methodological approaches that encompass additional potential 
domestic and external indicators of current account sustainability should be considered. 
Eventually, case studies may even be a more appropriate way to explore the issue in further 
research.  
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
   3
INTRODUCTION 
  
The current account balance is an important indicator of a transition economy’s performance. 
Its significance stems from the fact that the current account balance, reflecting the saving-
investment ratio, is closely related to the status of the fiscal balance and private savings 
which are key factors of economic growth. Practically all transition economies have been 
involved in their own catching-up processes which includes financing a huge amount of 
productive investment without endangering their external sustainability as far as their current 
account positions and external debt are concerned. In fact, these economies suffer from 
relatively low and even stagnant saving rates. Hence, to close the gap they need to turn to 
foreign saving which has generally induced the high and even growing current account 
deficits of the last decade. In this respect, the problem of external imbalances is particularly 
important for Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies which joined the EU in May 
2004 and have already expressed their desire to adopt the Euro as soon as possible. 
Consequently, for the new (and other prospective) members of the EU a trade-off emerged 
between the catching up process and meeting the qualitative current account Maastricht 
criteria.
1         
 
The rise in current account deficits in transition economies has raised doubts about their 
sustainability and concerns regarding the potential impact that a rapid and disorderly 
correction of these imbalances might have. Roubini and Wachtel (1998) argued that the 
current account deficits seen in transition economies reflect two important aspects. On one 
hand, these deficits reflect the success of structural changes that have enabled capital and 
investment inflows and have opened up prospects of fast economic growth. On the other 
hand, from another perspective, current account deficits frequently reflect mismanaged 
transition processes featuring unsustainable imbalances that are potentially a source of value 
or a balance of payments crisis (e.g. Czech Rep. (1997), Russia (1998)). In line with this, 
strong demands emerged for assessing the sustainability of the external position of so far 
mainly neglected transition economies.    
 
The article is organised as follows. The next section presents current account balance as well 
as fiscal balance trends in transition economies in the 1992-2003 period. Section 3 presents 
some theoretical considerations and empirical evidence on the current account balance and its 
sustainability, which have so far mainly been concentrated on developed economies. 
Therefore, Section 4 describes the empirical methodology, assumptions, data and empirical 
results of assessed sustainable current account positions for the selected transition economies. 
The empirical work applies a solvency constraint inspired by Milesi-Feretti and Razin (1996, 
hereafter ‘MFR’) and Reisen (1998) and builds on the recent empirical researches of Doisy 
and Hervé (2003) and Zanghieri (2004). The final section provides some concluding remarks, 
including several implications for economic policy in the transition regions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Article 121 of the Treaty of the European Union (1992) stipulates that among other (qualitative) criteria »the 
situation and the evolution of the balance of current payments« of the applicant countries have to be examined 
before they enter the Euro Area. Recently, an important step towards the Euro Area was taken by Estonia, 
Lithuania and Slovenia which joined the ERM II with effect from 28 June 2004 (ECB, 2004). 
   4
CURRENT ACCOUNT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN TRANSITION 
ECONOMIES 
 
An overview of current account balances in transition economies shows that, with the 
exception of Russia – a major commodity exporter, the opening up to external trade has been 
accompanied by significant current account deficits. Nevertheless, a heterogeneous pattern in 
terms of the deficit level and in its dynamics both between and within transition regions is 
noticed. In the CEE region current account balances were not problematic with even a 
moderate positive balance as a share of GDP up until 1994 (averaging at around 1 percent of 
GDP), reflecting contractions in domestic demand, real exchange rate undervaluations and 
external financing constraints (see Figure 1). Afterwards, significant current account deficit 
deterioration was seen in the region, peaking at almost 7 percent of GDP in 1998 on average 
(e.g. Lithuania (11.7), Latvia (10.7) and Slovakia (9.6)), mostly as a result of growing 
imports of both consumption and investment goods. Moreover, the gradual growth of the 
current account deficit in the CEE region reflects a combination of long-term growth and 
structural factors, external shocks and domestic policies. More precisely, the deterioration of 
current accounts in the region was the result of the growth in merchandise trade deficits, 
downward trends in the service balance, rising indebtedness and profit repatriation as well as 
the consequence of the continuous real appreciation of domestic currency in most cases 
examined.
2  
 
Similar but even more intensive current account deficit dynamics were seen in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region by it achieving the top average current 
account deficit at a significantly higher level (13.7 percent of GDP) than the CEE region in 
1998. The biggest contributors to such a huge deterioration in the current account balance 
were some economies in the region with current account deficits above 30 percent of GDP 
(e.g. Turkmenistan (37.4), Azerbaijan (30.7)). Several factors contributed to this 
development. First, many countries in the region experienced large losses in their terms of 
trade as prices for energy imports from the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA) trading partners moved to market-determined levels. Second, these countries ran 
high negative fiscal imbalances as the authorities tried to absorb the revenue and expenditure 
pressure associated with sharp falls in national income and fiscal restructuring (see Figure 1). 
Third, as a result of the slow progress in building a competitive and diversified export sector 
trade liberalisation mainly stimulated imports of consumer goods and services. As a response 
to the Russian crisis (1998) the average current account deficits narrowed in the group. 
However, in many cases the deficits remained high – at around or even above 10 percent of 
GDP (Azerbaijan (15.9), Armenia (8.1) etc.) on average in the 2001-2003 period.
3 On the 
other hand, the Southern and Eastern Europe (SEE) region achieved the highest average 
current account deficit with around 20 percent of GDP in 1992 due to the enormous deficit in 
Albania (68.5 percent). Later these huge external imbalances improved significantly. 
However, at the beginning of the second half of the 1990s and in the first few years of this 
century they again deteriorated, mainly due higher oil prices, import demand, which has been 
                                                 
2 In transition economies a large part of real appreciation accounts for the real appreciation that reflects 
productivity gains in the tradable sector (due to the Balassa-Samuelson (B-S) effect) This trend is commonly the 
case in fast-growing economies like transition economies where the catching-up process is mainly driven by the 
increasingly productive tradable sector. For example, Coricelli and Jazbec (2001) estimated that B-S effects in 
(19 selected) transition economies were between 0.7-1.2 percent p.a. over the 1990-1998 period.  
3 The selected CIS economies, later included in the empirical analysis, were generally confronted with relatively 
low average current account deficits (Kazakhstan with -2.7 percent of GDP)) and even surpluses (Russia (9.2), 
Ukraine (5.7) and Uzbekistan (1.9)) in the 2001-2003 period. The only exception is Moldova with an average 
deficit of -6.6 percent of GDP in the same period.   5
fuelled by the rapid growth in credit for the non-government sector (in Bulgaria), political 
uncertainty (in Serbia and Montenegro) and conflict/violence crisis (in Macedonia). 
Consequently, the average current account deficit was at 8.2 percent of GDP in the 2001-
2003 period in comparison with the previous three years when it averaged out at 5.9 percent 
of GDP (see Figure 1).
4      
 
Figure 1: Average Current Account Balance (CA), Fiscal Balance (GB)  
and Private Balance (PB) in Transition Economies,  
1992-2003 (in percentage of GDP; unweighted averages) 
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Note:  CEE (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia)  
SEE (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, and 
Serbia and Montenegro)  
CIS (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan). 
 
Sources: WDI, 2004; EIU, 2004; EBRD, 2004; own calculations. 
 
As already mentioned, one of the most important determinants of the increasing external 
imbalances has been the worsening budgetary performance in transition economies (see 
Aristovnik and Zajc, 2001, and Fidrmuc, 2003). The patterns in public deficits reflect local 
factors as well as the mixed advice transition economies received from Western economies 
and institutions such as the IMF and the WB. An analysis of the fiscal data of transition 
economies yields several stylized facts. Most importantly, almost all transition economies 
went through a dramatic fiscal adjustment. In fact, the turnaround in fiscal imbalances has 
                                                 
4 In fact, all SEE economies faced a moderate, i.e. up to 1 percentage point (like Albania, Croatia and Romania) 
or even a significant, i.e. more than 3 percentage point (like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and 
Serbia and Montenegro) deterioration of their average current account position when comparing both three-year 
periods.    6
been especially remarkable for CIS economies which reduced their average deficits from an 
average of 8.8 percent of GDP in the 1992-1997 period to a moderate fiscal deficit of 2.1 
percent of GDP in the 1998-2003 period. The extent of this fiscal adjustment in CIS is more 
than twice as much as that of SEE economies whose average deficit was reduced from 5.9 
percent of GDP to 3.9 percent of GDP in the same period. These fiscal imbalance trends were 
the outcome of a major revenue shock at the start of transition. For many CIS economies, 
independence from the Soviet Union also meant the loss of large fiscal transfers from 
Moscow which further compounded declines in government revenues from the recession and 
the flawed tax system with its weak administration.
5 Consequently, the CIS’ average budget 
revenues declined from 29.3 percent of GDP in 1992 to 24.1 percent of GDP in 2003. 
Contrary to the CIS and SEE fiscal imbalance trends, CEE economies started with much 
lower average fiscal deficits, averaging out at 1.8 percent of GDP in 1992-1997 and even 
deteriorating to an average 3 percent of GDP in 1998-2003, generally as a result of 
maintaining relatively high government expenditure shares (an average of 38.3 percent of 
GDP in the 1998-2003 period) and a moderate decline of government revenues in the period 
(e.g. in Czech Republic and Poland by more than ten structural points in the 1992-2003 
period). An important measure to deal with the revenue shortfall was the adoption of value-
added tax (VAT). The rate initially adopted has generally been reduced, and in most CEE 
states VAT now provides about the same proportion of total fiscal revenue as in most 
Western European states (i.e. 15 to 25 percent). Moreover, a number of CEE and SEE 
economies have introduced, or are in the process of introducing, uniform personal income 
taxes.  
 
In the view of the uncertainties regarding saving and investment behavior in transition 
regions, the role of fiscal policy needs to have a built-in degree of flexibility to 
counterbalance potential saving-investment imbalances and the vulnerability implied by large 
external current account deficits. However, for the CEE economies the European Union (EU) 
has placed an emphasis on low budget deficits but at the same time it requires the adoption of 
a number of relatively costly social program and structural measures, which places upward 
pressure on government expenditure. Moreover, in light of the forthcoming adoption of the 
euro in many CEE economies the Maastricht fiscal deficit criteria should be reconsidered as 
these economies might risk hampering the development of baldy needed infrastructure and 
achieving the so-called ‘Golden Rule capital-labor ratio’.
6 Nevertheless, the sustainability of 
an economy’s fiscal balance has important implications for the sustainability of its external 
position. In transition economies, sizable fiscal deficits have generally not been offset by 
higher private saving and have consequently been reflected in large current account deficits 
(see Figure 1). In fact, for many economies in transition government budget deficits have 
been financed in large measure through external borrowing in a foreign currency, with most 
of the outstanding stock of external debt in each country being owed by the government. In 
reality, sizable external borrowing to finance productive investment may be appropriate when 
large potential returns from investment are expected and confronted with the relatively high 
cost of domestic finance.
7  
                                                 
5 For example, in 1992 both Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic lost transfers from Moscow which were 
equivalent to about 18 percent of GDP in 1991 (Alam and Sundberg, 2002).  
6 The ‘golden rule’ is the level of capital-labor ratio that maximizes consumption per worker in the steady state. 
Kandogan (2004) set out that capital-labor ratios in transition economies significantly lag behind those of the 
EU-15 economies. For example, Germany has a capital-labor ratio that is more than 2.5 times higher than 
Slovenia, 5 times higher than Slovakia and around 12 times higher than Bulgaria and Latvia.  
7 One of the most important problematic aspects of public finance in many transition economies is the increasing 
strain exerted by the pension system, based on a pay-as-you-go system. Due to its unsustainability, several CEE 
economies have already moved to raise the retirement age and to supplement the public retirement system with a   7
 
Overall, the historical current account deficits and their most likely future persistence in these 
economies raise the question of whether they constitute a problem from an economic 
perspective, e.g. whether they are sustainable in the medium term. However, before trying to 
answer this question let us undertake a review of recent theoretical and empirical 
considerations of the current account balance and its sustainability.   
 
 
VIEWS ON THE CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE AND ITS SUSTAINABILITY 
 
Do Current Account Deficits Matter? 
 
Edwards (2001) in his comprehensive review describes the evolving views of economists’ 
regarding the nature and consequences of current account deficits. The attitude has changed 
from ‘the current account matters’ to ‘the current account deficit does not matter as long as 
the public sector is in balance’, then to ‘the current account deficit may matter’. In fact, in the 
1970s this elastic approach to the current account was been placed on the backburner and 
attention was switched to the intertemporal properties of current account deficits. In terms of 
national accounting, the current account is simply the difference between national saving and 
investment. Since both saving and investment are inherently intertemporal phenomena, e.g. 
saving with respect to the lifetime of individuals and investment with respect to the expected 
future return on investment, the same must also hold for the current account.  
 
In this respect, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) provided an extensive review of modern models 
of the current account that assume intertemporal optimisation on behalf of consumers and 
firms. In this type of model (assuming a constant interest rate), consumption smoothing 
across periods is one of the fundamental drivers of the current account. According to the 
intertemporal approach, if output falls below its permanent value there will be a higher 
current account deficit. Similarly, if investment increases above its permanent value the 
current account deficit will grow. The reason for this is that new investment projects will be 
partially financed by an increase in foreign borrowing, thus generating a bigger current 
account deficit. Likewise, increased government consumption will result in a higher current 
account deficit. If the constant world interest rate assumption is relaxed, a country’s net 
foreign asset position and the level of the world interest rate will fundamentally affect the 
current account deficit. Accordingly, if a country is a net foreign debtor, and the world 
interest rate exceeds its permanent level, the current account deficit will be higher (Miller, 
2002).  
 
During the last three decades most financial crises highlighted the part played by large 
current account deficits in the run-up to crisis episodes. Consequently, the concept of a 
sustainable current account deficit became an important theoretical, political and economic 
issue. In this respect, Corsetti et al. (1998) concluded that, on the whole, those countries hit 
hardest by currency crises were those which had persistent current account deficits 
throughout the 1990s.
8 This result is confirmed by Radelet and Sachs (2000), Kamin et al. 
(2001) and Edwards (2004), whereby Edwards shows that the probability of experiencing 
                                                                                                                                                        
multi-pillar system. On the other hand, the majority of CIS economies face less of a public sector burden with 
regard to retirement costs because the level of government-promised retirement benefits is lower (Svejnar, 
2001).  
8 Nevertheless, this does not imply that a large deficit always leads to a crisis, nor that a crisis can only occur if a 
large current account deficit is present (Summers, 2000).     8
abrupt current account reversals is closely linked to the size of current account deficits. 
Accordingly, although this is not a universal truth, the conventional wisdom is that current 
account deficits above 5 percent of GDP generally represent a problem, especially if funded 
through short-term borrowing.
9 However, because of the lasting improvement in capital 
market access, the persistent enhancement of the terms of trade and productivity growth, as 
seen in transition economies, can as predicted by the intertemporal models finance moderate 
current account deficits on an ongoing basis. Nevertheless, Edwards (2001) supported the 
relevancy of current account imbalances as there is strong evidence that large current account 
deficits should be a cause for concern of economic policy.  
      
Solvency, sustainability and excessive current account imbalances 
 
According to MFR (1996), three different yet interrelated concepts can be distinguished: an 
economy’s solvency, current account sustainability and current account deficit excessiveness. 
In fact, the three concepts of current account deficits imply an increasing order of 
restrictiveness. First, an economy is treated as solvent if the present discounted value of the 
future trade surplus is equal to the current external indebtedness. Ultimately, such a definition 
is difficult to apply since it relies on future events/policy decisions without imposing any 
‘structure’ on them. Second, a more narrowed definition of solvency brings us to a more 
widespread idea i.e. the definition of sustainability. A current account is sustainable if the 
continuation of the current government policy stance and/or of the present private sector 
behaviour will not entail a need for a ‘drastic’ policy shift or a balance of payments 
(currency) crisis.
10 Finally, an unsustainable deficit should be distinguished from an 
excessive one, i.e. a deficit which is too large to be explained in the terms of any given model 
of consumption, investment and production. In fact, the notion of ‘excessive’ current account 
deficits is based of deviations from an ‘optimal’ benchmark, which can be calculated under 
some strict assumptions such as perfect capital mobility and efficient financial markets.
11 
 
In order to estimate current account sustainability, different approaches were developed in the 
last decade. The fact that the results of these have to be interpreted with caution means that 
their informative value is limited, however. For instance, models based on the intertemporal 
balance of payments theory show unrealistically large values for sustainable current account 
balances.
12 While the results improve if credit restrictions and portfolio processes are taken 
into consideration, even minor changes in portfolio preferences lead to substantial changes in 
sustainable deficits. Moreover, on the whole these models are very sensitive to the choice of 
parameters, and estimating the relevant coefficients is fraught with a high degree of 
uncertainty. In some cases, particularly in transition economies, problematic data availability 
makes it even more difficult to define these approaches empirically.   
 
                                                 
9 Freund (2000) and Mann (2000) concluded from their studies of the experience of industrial countries that 
pressure for correction often arises when external deficits are in the range of 4 to 5 percent of GDP. 
10 A similar notion of current account sustainability has been applied by many researchers such as Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (2000), Holman (2001), Megarbane (2002) and Zanghieri (2004).   
11 The appraisal of the excessiveness of current account deficits frequently consists of setting a benchmark from 
the medium- and long-term determinants of the saving-investment balance. See, for instance, Isard et al., 2001, 
and Bussière et al., 2004. 
12 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), for example, developed a model where the steady state trade surplus is 45 
percent of GDP. Similarly unrealistic results stemmed from the model developed by de Cordoba and Kehoe 
(2000) predicting the optimal response to financial reform in Spain would be to run a current account deficit 
peaking at 50 percent of GDP.   9
The most common way of assessing a given economy’s external position was developed by 
MFR (1996) who modelled a framework to analyse current account sustainability, where the 
‘sustainable’ level of the current account was that level consistent with solvency, i.e. satisfies 
the criterion that the total external debt to GDP ratio should not increase.
13 In fact, they used 
standard accounting identities to present the notion of intertemporal solvency, emphasising in 
particular the role of real domestic growth (γ), real interest rates (r
*) and the real exchange 
rate (ε):  
     
tb = 1 – i – c – g =– f (r
* – γ – ε)           (1) 
 
where  tb,  i,  c,  g and f are the long-run trade balance, domestic investment, private 
consumption, current government consumption, and external debt as a ratio to GDP, 
respectively. The first part of the expression reflects the fact that the economy has to be in a 
steady state for stabilisation of the debt to GDP ratio to correspond to a sustainable trade 
balance. The latter part of the expression indicates the role played by the average future value 
of world interest rates, domestic growth and the long-run trend in the real exchange rate in 
determining the resource transfers needed to keep the debt to GDP ratio from increasing.  
 
Condition (1) also indicates that the economy’s long-run absorption can be higher than its 
income only if the economy is a net creditor. On the other hand, net debtor economies, like 
transition economies, have to run long-run trade surpluses and pay the interest on its external 
liabilities in order for the foreign debt to GDP ratio to remain constant. In addition, higher 
economic growth and real exchange rate appreciation or a lower real interest rate can sustain 
a larger debt to GDP ratio.    
 
Later Reisen (1998) built on the work of MFR (1996) and Edwards et al. (1996) by 
considering the portfolio approach to the current account. When the economy is in a steady 
state, the current account deficit, cad, which can be sustained over the long run if the desired 
debt ratio, f
*, remains constant and the desired reserves, FX
*, rise in proportion to import 
growth, η, is expressed as follows: 
 
   [ ]
* * ) 1 /( ) ( ) ( FX f cad γ γ ε η ε γ + − + − + =                         (2) 
 
Equation (2) assumes two important things. First, the economy might want to hold a constant 
foreign reserves to import ratio. Second, due to world inflation or, for example, the Balassa-
Samuelson effect, a transition economy’s real exchange rate can become overvalued and 
provoke the reduction of both debt and foreign reserves. Therefore, sustainable current 
account deficits vary across economies and depend on the variables that affect portfolio 
decisions as well as economic growth. For instance, Reisen (1998) investigated current 
account deficits of four Latin American and four Asian economies and ascertained that 
sustainable current account deficits lie in the range of -1.6 to -3.8 percent of GDP. 
Nevertheless, such assessments are subject to uncertainties including long-term economic 
prospects and demand for the debt instruments of the economy in question.         
 
A largely unresolved question is whether net foreign direct investment (FDI) flows should be 
included when computing the sustainable level of the current account. FDI is generally 
                                                 
13 Another approach used in the literature is one that defines the sustainable current account balance as the 
balance that maintains a constant ratio of net foreign liabilities to GDP (see IMF, 2001) or a targeted external 
debt to exports ratio (see Dadusch et al., 1994), which is more relevant to a large and relatively less open 
economy.    10
considered more stable than other financial flows as investments in fixed assets may be more 
difficult to liquidate (compared with portfolio investments) and because direct investors tend 
to make long-term commitments (McGettigan, 2000). Besides, FDI can have a considerable 
and immediate positive impact on economies’ external financial positions and, thus, on their 
development prospects since the financial effect of FDI complements its potential 
technological, management and restructuring impact. Further, FDI may improve foreign 
perceptions of the host economy’s creditworthiness and thus contribute to the creation of a 
virtuous circle involving a reduction in borrowing costs, access to a broader range of 
financial instruments and more stable capital flows. Moreover, it is often maintained that FDI 
will increase an economy’s exports and improve the current account balance in the longer 
term (UN Economic Commission for Europe, 2001). Therefore, an increasing current account 
deficit financed by FDI (especially greenfield investment) should not be a cause for concern. 
Accordingly, one should consider FDI flows when calculating the sustainable current account 
balance.
14       
 
It should be emphasised that the calculation of a sustainable current account deficit is subject 
to some serious limitations. For instance, the steady state assumption constitutes a relatively 
strong assumption for transition economies inasmuch as it requires that future structural 
changes in an economy are foreseeable or, alternatively, that the current state of the economy 
can be considered as the steady state. Hence, it is hard to say that the current state of the 
transition economy can be considered as a steady state while it is adjusting its the economic 
system to a fully-fledged market system. Further, sustainability calculations neglect some 
important aspects of the issue of how the current account adjusts to a shock, i.e. the transition 
from an old (long-run) sustainable current account to a new one. In fact, Sasin (2001) stated 
that long-run sustainability ratios computed using a theoretical framework might be 
misleading and it is in fact hard to conclude whether in the short-run the current account 
deficit is truly excessive. Therefore, caution should be exercised with respect to the results 
and implications of such calculations.  
 
 
THE EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Empirical Methodology 
 
Following the simple accounting methodology of Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (1996) (MFR) 
sustainable levels of current account deficits are calculated.
15 Later Milesi-Ferretti et al. 
(1998) and Cashin and McDermott (1998) argued that the calculated sustainable level of the 
current account deficit may be ambiguous if we consider the possibility of a reversal (or a 
sudden stop) of capital flows. Accordingly, Doisy and Hervé (2003) modified identity (1) in 
order to consider the fact that a considerable part of transition economies’ external imbalance 
is financed by an almost non-debt creating instrument.
16 In order to calculate the current 
                                                 
14 On the contrary, Reisen (1998) argued that the distinction between FDI and other capital account items can be 
blurred as net FDI will change the level of an economy’s net external liabilities just like any other capital flow. 
Similarly, the UN Economic Commission for Europe (2001) revealed that FDI may pose some of the same risk 
and financial management challenges as other capital inflows.  
15 This method has been used several times by the ’IMF’s economy assessments, e.g. for Mexico (2001) and for 
Slovakia (2002).  
16 The average net FDI ratio to current account deficit exceeded 100% in Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Macedonia and Moldova, and even 200% in Slovakia in the 2000-2003 period. In other countries, the net FDI 
ratio to current account deficits have accounted for a smaller share of financing the current account such as in   11
account balance so as to allow it to be compared with the already presented accounting 
frameworks, not only is it necessary to consider the non-interest component of the current 
account balance but it is also necessary to subtract the part of the current account deficit 
which can be financed via non-debt creating flows such as foreign direct investment (FDI).
17 
Moreover, for simplicity we consider that the long-term real exchange rate is constant (ε=0). 
Hence, the sustainable primary (non-interest) current account balance as a percentage of 
GDP, ca’, can be written as: 
 
ca’ = – f (r
* – γ) – fdi                      (3) 
 
where fdi is the ratio of net FDI to GDP. However, we should bear in mind that this modified 
model is not an absolutely riskless form of financing the deficit. While their volatility is far 
less than that of other forms of capital flows, FDI inflows can experience an abrupt stop as in 
the case of Russia in the aftermath of the 1998 crisis (see McGettigan, 2000).  
 
In transition economies a general tendency for real appreciation over the last decade has been 
noticed. This tendency appears to be partly due to the undervaluation of their currencies at the 
outset of the transition period and partly due to shifts in macroeconomic fundamentals (such 
as productivity or technology), i.e. the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
18 Because such an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate mitigates the debt dynamics for the sustainability of the 
current account balance it should be considered when sustainability calculations are 
performed. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that the economy might want to hold a 
constant foreign reserve to import ratio. Accordingly, Resein’s (1998) accounting framework 
(2) based on the standard portfolio approach to the current account and modified with FDI to 
calculate long-term current account deficit sustainability is applied:   
 
[ ] fdi FX f cad + + − + − + =
* * ) 1 /( ) ( ) ( γ γ ε η ε γ                      (4) 
 
Empirical Data and Additional Assumptions 
 
We estimate current account sustainability for seventeen transition economies, i.e. the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (the CEE), 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, and Romania (the SEE) and Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan (the CIS).
19 However, in order to calculate a sustainable level of 
their current account balance numerous assumptions must be made. Indeed, this exercise is, 
by nature, quite sensitive to the various assumptions made about what is the steady state of 
the economies under consideration. Arbitrarily, the steady state for transition economies is 
considered to reflect the historical values of the key variables as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                        
Latvia (48.8), Romania (60.5), Lithuania (67.8) and Hungary (69.7) if we take into account only those countries 
experiencing current account deficits in the whole period 2000-2003.  
17 In fact, Frankel and Rose (1996) investigated a panel of annual data for over 100 developing economies from 
1971 to 1991 and found that a high ratio of FDI to debt is associated with a low likelihood of a currency crash. 
Moreover, Reisen (1998) emphasised that the case of Singapore which faced significant current account deficits 
in the 1970s, at around 20 percent of GDP several times. However, mainly due to the fact that almost half of the 
corresponding net capital inflows consisted of FDI, including favourable real domestic growth and a doubling of 
the domestic saving rate, a balance of payments crisis never developed.  
18 Moreover, Roubini and Wachtel (1998) argued that part of real appreciation in transition economies arises 
from the choice of the exchange-rate regime (e.g. a pegged exchange rate) and the ensuing capital inflows. 
Accordingly, the growing current account deficits might become unsustainable and demand the nominal and real 
depreciation of the currency.  
19 Due to data deficiencies other transition economies were not included in the sample.    12
-  the equilibrium level of external debt (f) is assumed to be the average of the 2000-
2003 period (EBRD data); alternatively, it is assumed for all sampled economies that 
foreign investors are comfortable tolerating a debt ratio of 45 percent (f
*); 
-  the average real interest rate (r
*) is the last available effective interest rate on external 
debt deflated with the latest GDP deflator of the main advanced world economies 
(EIU and IMF data); 
-  growth projections (γ) are the average over the 2000-2008 period (EIU data); 
-  the historical drift of the real effective exchange rate per unit of GDP growth (ε) is 
considered the most appropriate variable since the external debt is composed of a mix 
of the main international currencies in proportions that are quite variable over time 
(IMF data); 
-  the target level of foreign exchange reserves (FX
*) for all selected countries is 
assumed to be equal to the average of half the import ratio (six months of imports) of 
the 2000-2003 period (EBRD data); 
-  the real import growth rate (η) is the 2000-2003 period average ratio (EBRD data); 
and 
-  the average (2000-2003 period) volume of net foreign direct investment as a ratio to 
GDP (fdi) is taken in order to calculate the proportion of the current account deficit 
that has to be financed via debt-creating flows (EBRD data)
20; the simplifying 
assumption of no feedback of FDI flows on growth is also adopted.   
 
The assumptions underlying the projection exercises are summarized in Table 1 and 2. The 
empirical results are summarised in the next sub-section, which is divided into three parts. 
First, the simplest way of checking sustainability is applied by comparing differences 
between current account deficits and net FDI flows. The results for the selected transition 
economies in the period 1994-2003 are reported in Table 3. Secondly, MFR’s (1996) 
accounting methodology is applied to calculate medium-term current account sustainability 
levels for the transition economies. Finally, in order to calculate long-term current account 
sustainability positions Reisen’s (1998) accounting methodology is adopted. Empirical results 
are reported in Table 4.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 When considering FDI inflows two extremes are presumed. For the more advanced transition economies the 
completion of their privatisation programmes will most probably mean a significant reduction of their FDI 
inflows. Due to the relatively unrealistic assumption, another polar case in which FDI is fixed at 4 percent of 
GDP is considered.    13
Table 1:   The Assumptions for Current Account Sustainability Calculations  
(‘MFR’ Methodology) 
 
 
External 
debt  
(in % of 
GDP) 
average 
2000 - 
2003 
Real effective 
interest rate  
(in %) 
2003 
Real 
economic 
growth  
(in %) 
average 
2000-2008 
Net FDI 
(in % of 
GDP)  
average 
2000-2003 
Bulgaria 70.2 1.9 4.3 6.3 
Croatia 66.1 1.7 4.0 5.7 
Czech R.  36.7 2.4 3.5 8.5 
Estonia 59.7 3.6 6.4 5.7 
Hungary 55.8 1.7 3.8 1.4 
Kazakhstan 69.3 2.2 8.6 9.1 
Latvia 70.0 6.4 6.7 3.8 
Lithuania 34.7 4.1 6.6 3.6 
Macedonia 42.0 7.8 3.7 5.2 
Moldavia 84.1 3.0 5.4 7.3 
Poland 37.5 1.0 3.6 3.1 
Romania 31.3 2.8 4.6 2.7 
Russia 48.5 2.9 5.7 0.0 
Slovakia 55.9 2.3 4.2 8.8 
Slovenia 36.4 4.6 3.2 2.4 
Ukraine 35.3 5.2 6.9 2.1 
Uzbekistan 42.7 4.8 2.8 0.9 
  
               Source: WDI, 2004; EIU, 2004; EBRD, 2004; author’s calculations. 
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Table 2:   The Assumptions for Current Account Sustainability Calculations 
(‘Reisen’ Methodology) 
 
 
External 
debt  
(in % of 
GDP) 
average 
2000 - 
2003 
Real 
effective 
exchange 
rate (per 
unit of 
GDP 
growth) 
Real 
economic 
growth 
(in %) 
average 
2000-
2008 
Real 
import 
growth 
rate  
(in %) 
2000-
2003 
Net FDI
(in % of 
GDP)  
average 
2000-
2003 
Foreign 
exchange 
reserves 
(in % of 
GDP) 
average 
2000-
2003 
Target 
level of 
foreign 
exchange 
reserves 
(in % of 
GDP) 
average 
 2000-
2003 
Bulgaria 70.2  0.26 4.3 13.3 6.3 26.8  42.8
Croatia 66.1  0.08 4.0 10.2 5.7 23.0  27.8
Czech R.  36.7  0.45 3.5 9.7 8.5 29.1  47.6
Estonia 59.7  0.07 6.4 14.8 5.7 16.1  59.4
Hungary 55.8  0.36 3.8 10.2 1.4 18.8  41.1
Kazakhstan 69.3 -0.02 8.6 6.1 9.1 10.6 19.4
Latvia 70.0  -0.05 6.7 11.5 3.8 14.1  31.8
Lithuania 34.7  0.26 6.6 14.1 3.6 15.0  44.3
Macedonia 42.0 0.82 3.7 4.4 5.2 19.5 27.6
Moldavia 84.1  -0.06 5.4 17.3 7.3 15.7  61.4
Poland 37.5  0.10 3.6 7.4 3.1 15.0  17.6
Romania 31.3  0.21 4.6 18.2 2.7 10.9  32.2
Russia 48.5  0.18 5.7 20.8 0.0 12.4  12.6
Slovakia 55.9  0.11 4.2 10.1 8.8 29.1  41.4
Slovenia 36.4  0.04 3.2 5.3 2.4 25.6  34.2
Ukraine 35.3  -0.02 6.9 -3.0 2.1 9.2  30.5
 
       Source: WDI, 2004; EIU, 2004; EBRD, 2004; author’s calculations. 
 
Empirical Results 
 
Current Account Deficits and Net FDI Flows 
 
One of the simplest definitions of the current account implies that a current account position 
is sustainable so long as foreign investors are willing to finance it. Since FDI is generally 
regarded as the most stable form of inflow and contributes to an economy’s growth potential, 
a simple way to check for sustainability is to see how much of the deficit is financed by FDI. 
Table 3 shows the difference between current account deficits and net FDI flows as a ratio to 
GDP for the 1994-2003 period. Since a number of transition economies, particularly 
advanced ones, have attracted significant amounts of FDI, in general a manageable external 
position in the region is expected. Indeed, from this point of view external sustainability does 
not seem to be a problem for most of the selected transition economies.
21 Nevertheless, the 
situation in economies such as the Baltic States, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, and 
Moldova has worsened rapidly in recent years. In order to confirm these conclusions, more 
                                                 
21 However, the trend of differences between current account deficits and net FDI flows may have be seen as 
providing a good signal of the forthcoming Czech currency crisis in 1997.    15
sustainable current account positions should be calculated by applying the accounting 
methodologies suggested by MFR (1996) and Reisen (1998). 
 
Table 3 Differences between Current Account Deficits and Net FDI Flows in Selected 
Transition Economies, 1994-2003 (in % of GDP) 
 
  1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  2002  2003
CEE 
Czech  R.  0.2 -2.2 4.9 4.4 -4.0 -8.7 -4.4 -3.9 -5.8  3.9
Estonia 1.2  -0.7 6.0 8.6 -2.4 1.0 -0.9 -0.4  9.0  4.5
Hungary 7.1  -6.2 -1.1 0.7 3.9 4.3 6.3 1.9  6.2  10.9
Latvia 
-
11.6 -4.7 -1.9 -3.0 5.7 4.9 1.3 7.6  3.1  6.3
Lithuania  1.8 8.6 7.0 6.6 3.4 6.6 2.6 1.1 0.1 4.1
Poland -1.6  -1.5 0.2 1.8 1.1 3.7 1.1 -0.8  0.6  0.2
Slovakia  -5.9 -3.0 9.1 8.9 7.9 2.2 -6.8 1.4 -8.6 -0.7
Slovenia  -4.9 -0.6 -1.2 -1.9 -0.5 3.2 2.5 -2.1 -9.7  0.4
SEE 
Bulgaria -0.7  0.8 -3.0
-
15.0 -3.7 -1.1 -2.4 2.5 -0.3  1.6
Croatia  -4.5 9.2 3.4 12.2 2.9 -0.1 -3.4 -3.4 4.7 1.3
Macedonia  4.0 4.7 6.3 6.9 4.2 0.0 -2.9 -5.8 6.5 5.1
Romania  0.4 3.8 6.1 2.4 2.0 0.8 0.8 2.7 1.0 3.3
CIS 
Kazakhstan 4.8  -3.4 -1.8 -2.3 0.4 -8.4
-
10.7 -7.9 -5.9 -7.5
Moldova 6.3  1.9 10.1 10.2 15.2 -6.4 -0.2 -3.7  -1.2  5.4
Russia -2.9  -2.6 -3.2 -0.4 -0.6
-
13.1
-
17.9
-
11.1 -8.4 -8.2
Ukraine 3.0  3.2 1.5 1.5 1.3 -6.8 -6.6 -5.7  -9.3  -8.7
Uzbekistan -3.1 -1.7 6.5 3.2 -0.5 0.3 -1.4 0.2 -2.8 -6.2
 
Note: difference = -ca – fdi 
 
          Source: author’s calculations. 
 
The ‘Milesi-Ferretti and Razin’ and ‘Reisen’ Methodologies 
 
By extending the works of Doisy and Hervé (2003) and Zanghieri (2004) to a substantially 
larger sample of transition economies and a longer time span, sustainable current account 
positions were calculated and are presented in Table 4. Under the unlikely scenario of a 
sudden stop in FDI flows the current account deficits seem not to be sustainable for the whole 
sample of economies in the CEE and SEE regions. Indeed, their sustainable size as a 
percentage share of GDP is relatively small, fluctuating between 1.7 (Macedonia) and -1.7 
(Bulgaria). The lowest sustainable current account balance, namely in Macedonia, can chiefly 
be explained by the fact that this economy has been projected to have one of the lowest 
average growth rates of real GDP (3.7 percent p.a.) and the highest real effective interest rate 
among all selected transition economies (7.8 percent). On the contrary, Bulgaria is confronted 
with one of the lowest real effective interest rates (1.9 percent) among the transition   16
economies and, consequently, the highest sustainable level of current account balance. On the 
other hand, in the CIS region only Moldova seems to have an unsustainable non-interest 
current account position, which recently averaged out at more than -17 percent of GDP.
22 
 
When we take into consideration the arbitrary threshold of 4 percent of GDP for future FDI 
flows, the observed current account deficits in the CEE and SEE regions generally reflect  
sustainable positions. However, Latvia (-8.4 percent of GDP) and Macedonia (-4.9) in fact 
have deficits that are well above the estimated sustainable levels. A similar conclusion holds 
for Moldova within the CIS region, which exceeds its estimated sustainable level by more 
than ten percentage points. This huge difference between actual and estimated sustainable 
current account positions in Moldova emerges in spite of it having one of the highest levels of 
sustainable current account deficits (-6.0 percent of GDP), induced by its relatively high ratio 
of external debt.  
 
Further, if we assume that the observed average level of FDI will be kept in the medium term 
in the transition regions similar results to the preceding scenario are found. As far as the CEE 
region is concerned, the actual average non-interest current account deficits lie well below the 
estimated sustainable levels for the great majority of countries. Surprisingly, high levels of 
sustainable current account deficits are held by Slovakia and the Czech Republic (in the CEE 
region) with around 10 and 9 percent of GDP, respectively, and Bulgaria and Croatia (in the 
SEE region) in the range of 7-8 percent of GDP. These high levels do not derive from a very 
high average growth prospective but from the relatively low real effective interest and 
significant net FDI flows seen in recent years. On the contrary, due to the relatively low net 
FDI inflows Romania has moved beyond the sustainable level of -3.2 percent of GDP and 
joins Latvia, Macedonia and Moldova with their unsustainable current account positions. 
However, not far away and lying around half a percentage point from the unsustainable 
current account balance threshold are Lithuania and, not surprisingly, Hungary, with the 
lowest net FDI flows (averaging at 1.4 percent of GDP) in the CEE region recently.
23          
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Despite its recent strong economic growth, averaging at more than 6.7 percent in the 2001-2003 period, 
Moldova is known as the poorest (around USD 450 GDP per capita (PPP) in 2003) and one of the most highly 
indebted countries in Europe (averaging at around 80 percent of GDP in recent years). Not surprisingly, the 
EBRD (2004) is quite pessimistic about Moldova’s ability to service or reschedule its external debt in the near 
future and warns about its economic stability. Relative to this, in spite of the relatively high net FDI seen in 
recent years (almost 8 percent of GDP in the 2000-2003 period), a significant downward trend (only around 2 
percent of GDP in 2003) is noticed.   
23 In order to ensure the sustainability of Lithuania’s sizeable current account deficit, the ECB (2004) sets out a 
determination of the authorities to pursue sound fiscal policies, to contain domestic credit growth and to provide 
effective financial supervision. Similarly prudent fiscal policies by the ECB are warranted in light of Hungary’s 
relatively large current account deficit (2004).  
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Table 4 Medium- and Long-term Sustainable Current Account Balances  
(‘Milesi-Ferretti and Razin’ and ‘Reisen’ Methods) (in % of GDP) 
 
Actual f 
(‘MFR’ Methodology)
* 
Constant f (45 % GDP) 
and 
FX (0.5 import) 
(‘Reisen’s’ Methodology)
**  Actual CA 
 
No 
FDI 
Stable 
FDI  Baseline 
No FDI 
(‘Transitional 
CA’)
*** 
Stable 
FDI 
Baseline 
(‘Transitional 
CA’)
***  
Non-
interest 
CA 
Average 
(2000-2003) 
CA 
Average 
(2000-2003) 
CEE (average)  -0.7 -4.7  -5.4  0.2  (4.6)  -3.8  -4.5(-0.1) -3.3 -5.7 
Czech R.  -0.4  -4.4  -8.9  1.3 (2.5)  -2.7  -7.2 (-5.9)  -1.4  -5.9 
Estonia  -1.6  -5.6  -7.4  1.9 (11.5)  -2.1  -3.9 (5.7)  -4.0  -8.8 
Hungary  -1.2  -5.2  -2.6  0.8 (6.7)  -3.2  -0.7 (5.3)  -2.2  -7.7 
Latvia  -0.2  -4.2  -4.0  -1.6 (8.1)  -5.6  -5.4 (4.3)  -8.4  -8.4 
Lithuania  -0.8  -4.8  -4.5  -0.1 (3.9)  -3.9  -3.5 (0.3)  -3.9  -5.6 
Poland  -1.0  -5.0  -4.1  -1.0 (-0.9)  -5.0  -4.1 (-4.0)  -2.3  -3.4 
Slovakia  -1.1  -5.1  -9.9  0.5 (5.0)  -3.5  -8.3 (-3.8)  -3.8  -5.2 
Slovenia  0.5  -3.5  -1.9  -0.7 (0.2)  -4.7  -3.2 (-2.3)  -0.2  -0.2 
SEE (average)  -0.6  -4.6  -5.5  0.5 (4.1)  -3.5  -4.5 (-0.9)  -3.9  -5.7 
Bulgaria  -1.7  -5.7  -7.9  1.8 (8.5)  -2.2  -4.5 (2.3)  -4.4  -6.6 
Croatia  -1.6  -5.6  -7.3  -0.2 (5.3)  -4.2  -5.9 (-0.5)  -2.7  -5.5 
Macedonia  1.7  -2.3  -3.5  -1.6 (1.0)  -5.6  -6.8 (-4.2)  -4.9  -5.9 
Romania  -0.6  -4.6  -3.1  2.1 (1.7)  -1.9  -0.6 (-1.0)  -3.7  -4.6 
CIS (average)  -1.5  -5.5  -5.4  -1.6 (6.3)  -5.6  -6.3 (1.7)  0.8  2.0 
Kazakhstan  -4.5  -8.5  -13.6  -4.3 (5.7)  -8.3  -13.4 (-3.4)   -4.3  -1.1 
Moldova  -2.0  -6.0  -9.4  4.5 (16.7)  0.5  -2.8 (9.4)  -17.2  -7.4 
Russia  -1.4  -5.4  -1.3  -0.8 (0.8)  -4.8  -0.8 (0.8)  13.7  11.4 
Ukraine  -0.6  -4.6  -2.7  -5.9 (1.9)  -9.9  -8.0 (-0.2)  7.3  5.5 
Uzbekistan  0.9 -3.1 0.0  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 4.3  1.7 
 
Notes:  
* ca’ = – f (r
* – γ) – fdi;   
* * ca’= -[ f
* (γ+ ε) –((η+ε-γ)/(1+γ))FX
*)]-fdi;  
***   ca’= -1/5[f
*– f( 1– γ – ε) – (FX
*- ((1-η-ε)/(1+γ)FX)] - fdi; ‘Transitional’ 
current account balances are in parentheses (hypothetical adjustment of the 
current external debt to GDP ratio to 45 percent (f
*) and of foreign exchange 
reserves to a targeted level of half the import to GDP ratio (FX
*).  
 
        Source: author’s calculations. 
 
However, in order to include the role of real exchange rate and the desired level of foreign 
exchange reserves in the (long-term) sustainability calculations, Reisen’s (1998) 
methodology is applied. Table 4 shows the results of Equation 4 for the long-term steady 
state current account ratio implying constant external debt and reserve levels relative to GDP. 
It is assumed that foreign investors tolerate a debt ratio of 45 percent (f
*) and that the 
domestic economy has its target level of foreign exchange reserves at half the import ratio 
(six months of imports). The calculated steady state deficits, as shown in Table 4, fluctuate 
highly from the lowest levels in Romania (-0.6), Hungary (-0.7) and Russia (-0.8) to the 
highest sustainable levels in Kazakhstan (-13.4), Slovakia (-8.3) and Ukraine (-8.0) if current 
net FDI flows are taken into consideration. Again, the same as with the MFR empirical 
results an unsustainable current account position is found in Latvia, Romania and Moldova. 
However, contrary to the previous results Estonia, Hungary and Lithuania show   18
unsustainable current account deficits, whereas Macedonia now suggests a sustainable 
position (due to the relatively high real appreciation and higher external debt assumption). 
 
If we return to the results acquired using the MFR methodology, it is probably quite a strong 
assumption that the observed value of the debt is taken as the sustainable one, particularly in 
Moldova (84.1 percent of GDP in the 2000-2003 period), Bulgaria (70.2), Latvia (70.0) and 
Kazakhstan (69.3), whose external debt is higher by international standards. On the other 
hand, it is reasonable to assume that other economies like Romania (31.3), Lithuania (34.7), 
Ukraine (35.3), Slovenia (36.4) and the Czech Republic (36.7) could increase their external 
debt without prejudicing their financial stability. Therefore, a hypothetical adjustment of the 
current external debt to GDP ratio to 45 percent and of foreign exchange reserves to a target 
level of half the import to GDP ratio is considered. Not surprisingly, the resulting 
‘transitional’ current account balances vary significantly between transition countries. For 
instance, to reach the targeted debt to GDP and reserve levels within five years the Czech 
Republic could afford to run a current account deficit equalling around 6 percent of GDP on 
average, mainly due to its low external debt ratio. On the other hand, due to its relatively high 
external debt and low international reserves Moldova for instance would have to run a current 
account surplus representing more than 9 percent of GDP (see Table 4).   
          
To sum up, the empirical analyses show that the conventional wisdom of a current account 
sustainability threshold of 5 percent can easily be applied to transition economies. 
Nevertheless, given the limitations of the applied accounting frameworks the analysis above 
should be complemented in the future by a set of indicators that have been found to have 
predictive power in identifying unsustainable current account deficits such as the level of 
savings and investment, the fiscal balance, the openness of an economy, and the composition 
of external liabilities. In fact, jointly examining the variety of indicators found to have 
predictive power in a financial crisis in each particular country would give us a clearer 
picture of current account sustainability in the transition regions. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has examined the dynamics and related sustainability of current account positions 
of several transition countries. By using different accounting framework approaches the 
empirical results show that on the strict (and quite unrealistic) assumption of a sudden halt in 
foreign direct investment (FDI) most of the selected countries would not have a sustainable 
current account deficit level. More realistically, by adopting an arbitrary threshold of 4 
percent of GDP for future FDI the observed current account deficit then appears to become 
more sustainable, although some countries still reveal unsustainable levels of current account 
deficits in the medium term. Similarly, on the assumption that the observed level of FDI 
flows will be kept in the medium run almost all the countries could optimally have a higher 
level of external deficit, with the exception of countries such as Baltic States, Hungary, 
Macedonia, Moldova and Romania. The analysis also reveals that the current account deficits 
of transition economies in excess of 5 percent of GDP generally pose external sustainability 
problems. Finally, as part of strengthening the external position the further promotion of FDI 
(especially greenfield investments)  and a prudent fiscal policy should become necessary 
elements of economic policy created in the region.   
 
To conclude, the simplicity and restrictiveness of the applied accounting frameworks and 
data limitations call for some additional approaches to measure the transition economies’   19
external sustainability. Therefore, certain other methodological approaches that encompass 
additional potential domestic and external indicators of current account sustainability should 
be considered. Moreover, case studies may even be a more appropriate way to explore the 
issue in further research.  
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